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EXPLAINING MARKET MECHANISMS
Thomas W. Merrill*
In recent years, environmental regulation has seen a debate between supporters of traditionalcommand-and-control regulation--a
system of uniform pollution control standards- and proponents of a
system of fees or permits for individualpolluters known as market
mechanisms. In this article, Professor Merrill considers two theories,
wealth-maximization theory and distributionaltheory, that have been
used to explain the emergence of market mechanisms in American
environmentalpolicy. He notes that (1) relatively few American environmental-enforcementprograms have adopted market mechanisms;
(2) those that exist overwhelmingly use grandfathered transferable
permits instead of pollution taxes or auctioned permits; and (3) they
are always based on pollution control standards that have been established before the market mechanisms are put in place. Professor
Merrill finds that the distributionaltheory best explains why grandfatheredpermits are used most often and why, more generally, adoption of market mechanisms is not more widespread. Finally, noting
that no inherent conflict exists between the wealth maximization and
distributionaltheories, Professor Merrill concludes that a framework
building upon both theories may lead to a better understandingof the
debate between command and control and market mechanisms.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Of the various innovations in environmental policy in the last
twenty-five years, one of the most controversial has been the effort to replace traditional command-and-control regulation with market mechanisms.
Command-and-control regulation refers to a system of pollution
control based on uniform standards of performance for sources of pollution. Most typically, regulators adopt standards that specify for a particular category of sources how much of a given pollutant a source is
permitted to emit over a given unit of time. All sources that fall within
the category are then required to achieve compliance with this standard,
* John Paul Stevens Professorof Law, Northwestern University.
The author is grateful for suggestions provided by David A. Dana, William H. Rodgers, Jr., and
Henry E. Smith.
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unless granted a variance. Often, but not always,' these standards are
fixed on the basis of the degree of control that can be achieved using existing technology.
Market mechanisms, in contrast, are systems of pollution control
based on the imposition of a money charge on the emission of a quantity
of a given pollutant over a given unit of time. The charge can take the
form of a fee or tax imposed by the regulator, often referred to as a Pigouvian tax, after the early proponent of the idea, economist Arthur
Pigou. 2 Alternatively, the charge can be imposed by requiring sources to
purchase permits, from either the government or other sources, authorizing the emission of a quantity of a given pollutant over a given unit of
time.
As befits a controversial subject, the literature on command-andcontrol versus market mechanisms is primarily normative.3 The partisans
of market mechanisms stake their case on the superior efficiency of a system that sets a price on the emission of pollutants and thereby creates an
incentive for sources to reduce those emissions.' Such a system gives
regulated firms a great deal of flexibility. Each firm can choose either to
pay the pollution charge or to not pollute, whichever is cheaper. This
flexibility permits a given level of emissions reduction to be achieved at
the lowest cost: the emissions reduction will be carried out by the firms in
a position to do so with the least expenditure of resources. Thus, it is argued, market mechanisms are more efficient than command-and-control
regulation in the strong Pareto sense: no one is worse off (society
achieves the same level of emissions reduction it would get from command and control), and some are better off (fewer resources that could
be used for other worthy purposes are consumed in the pollution control
effort).
1. Wendy Wagner, writing in this issue, defines command-and-control regulation to mean a
uniform standard of performance based on technological feasibility. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards,2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83. Although uniform emissions standards
are most commonly based on existing technology, this is not invariably true. They can also be based on
the perceived impact of emissions on the ambient environment (as with respect to point source controls under the water quality standards required by the Clean Water Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)
(1994)) or can be based on a percentage adjustment from some benchmark of past emissions (as under
the new motor vehicle standards of the 1970 Clean Air Act). See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994).
2. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192-96 (4th ed. 1932); ARTHUR C.
PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE 164 (1912).
3. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment: Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341-51 (1985) (arguing against command-and-control regulation and
advocating a system of regulation based on market mechanisms); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano,
Emissions Trading: Why Is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 222-23 (1988)
(advocating market mechanisms as a preferred strategy for pollution control); Howard Latin, Ideal
Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reform, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270-73 (1985) (arguing in favor of uniform command-andcontrol regulation). For a recent overview, with extensive citations to the literature, see Jonathan
Baert Weiner, Global Environmental Regulation. Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J.
677, 704-35 (1999).
4. See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 3, at 222-23.
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The defenders of command and control generally marshal two types
of arguments in opposition. First, they express skepticism about whether
market mechanisms would work as advertised.' They point out that these
mechanisms require a foolproof method of monitoring the emissions of
all sources to make sure that no firms are cheating by emitting more
pollution than the amount for which they have paid. Moreover, pollution
taxes or tradable permits require the creation of elaborate institutional
infrastructures, which may not be adequately funded. Second, commandand-control defenders argue that market mechanisms send the wrong
message about environmental protection.6 Market mechanisms treat
pollution as just another cost of doing business, whereas pollution should
be treated as morally objectionable behavior that must be eliminated to
the greatest extent possible.
I do not propose to add to this normative debate. Instead, this article is part of a small but growing literature that seeks a positive theory of
the factors in the political system that favor or retard the adoption of
market mechanisms. 7 Specifically, I will address two questions about the
historical emergence of market mechanisms in the last twenty-five years.
The first asks why the political system remains so firmly committed to
command-and-control regulation- which remains the dominant paradigm in environmental law- and adopts market mechanisms only in exceptional circumstances. The second asks what form market mechanisms
are more likely to take when they are adopted: are such mechanisms
more likely to take the form of pollution taxes, tradable permits auctioned by the government, or tradable permits issued to incumbent polluters?
More specifically, part II describes two types of positive theories
employed to explain the emergence of market mechanisms as an alternative to command-and-control regulation: what I will call the wealthmaximization theory and the distributional theory. Then, to provide a
foundation for some casual empirical assessment of these theories, part
III presents a brief overview of the American experience with market
mechanisms as a pollution control strategy. Part IV considers, in light of
5. See Latin, supra note 3, at 1331.
6. See generally STEVEN KELMAN,
ENVIRONMENT (1981).

WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS

AND THE

7. For other instances of explanatory efforts, see, for example, Robert W. Hahn & Roger G.
Noll, Barriersto Implementing Tradable Air Pollution Permits: Problems and Regulatory Interactions,
1 YALE J. ON REG. 63 (1983); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Paul L. Joskow & Richard
Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37 (1998); Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments
in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. J. ENVTL. L. 313 (1998); B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regu-

lation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551 (1985); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1
[hereinafter Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls]; and Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to
the Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RES. J. (forthcoming
2000).
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the information revealed in part III, which of the two types of theories
offers the best explanation for the form that market mechanisms have assumed when they have been adopted. It concludes that the distributional
theory clearly provides the best explanation for what appears to be a
universal preference for grandfathered transferable permits rather than
pollution taxes or auctioned permits. Part V then turns to the considerably more difficult question of why market mechanisms are so rarely
adopted. Although this judgment is debatable, I argue that distributional
theory again appears to provide the better explanation for the dominance of command and control than does wealth-maximization theory. I
conclude with some comments about the possibility of achieving a synthesis of the wealth maximization and distributional perspectives to provide an even better explanation of the evolution of environmental control regimes.
II. Two POSITIVE THEORIES FOR THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET
MECHANISMS

Within the existing positive literature on market mechanisms, it is
possible to discern two general types of explanations for their emergence: wealth-maximization theory and distributional theory.
A.

Wealth-Maximization Theory

The wealth-maximization theory traces its provenance to the property rights literature of neoinstitutional economics and in particular to
the pioneering work of Harold Demsetz.8 The basic insight is that property rights emerge and recede in accordance with a criterion of societal
wealth maximization, in effect a type of cost-benefit analysis. The benefits of a property regime come in reducing wasteful competition to capture the economic rents associated with scarce resources (what the neoinstitutionalists call "rent dissipation") 9 and by making it easier to control
the external costs associated with resource use by reducing the number
of parties affected by such uses. I° The costs of such a regime include the
costs of defining property rights, identifying the owners of such rights,
and protecting the rights against interference by others. According to
wealth-maximization theory, if the social benefits of a property regime
exceed the social costs of creating and enforcing such a regime, then society will recognize property rights over a resource. Conversely, if the social benefits of a property regime do not exceed the social costs of creat8. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967);
see also ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, Some Economics of Property Rights, in ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK
127 (1977); Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of an Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1970).
9. See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 30-32 (2d ed. 1997).
10. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320 (1993).
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ing and enforcing such a regime, then society will not recognize property
rights over the resource.
A corollary to the wealth-maximization theory is that property regimes will exist in varying degrees of complexity in terms of the number
of "sticks" that are recognized as belonging in the bundle of rights of the
property owner and will exist with varying degrees of formality in terms
of how such rights are enforced." If the net benefits of a property regime
are positive but small, then this may result in the creation of a rudimentary property rights regime, such as one based on simple usufructuary
rights and enforced by informal social norms. As the surplus of benefits
relative to costs grows larger - that is, as the resources become more
scarce or externalities become more severe or as the costs of creating and
enforcing property rights fall - then we should expect to see more elaborate property regimes emerge. For example, usufructuary rights may
evolve toward full ownership rights including the rights to transfer and
inherit. Similarly, enforcement through social norms may be supplemented with common law remedies and criminal penalties.
Carol Rose, in a provocative article, has adopted this property rights
framework to explain the evolution of different forms of environmental
protection. 2 She describes four general control strategies, starting with
DO-NOTHING (leaving the problem unregulated), followed by
KEEPOUT (prohibiting new polluting sources), then RIGHTWAY
(command-and-control regulation), and lastly PROP (market mechanisms).'3 She suggests that, as a general matter, these four strategies are
characterized by progressively higher management costs, both in terms of
the costs of administrating the system and the costs to users of complying
with the system. 4 However, again as a general matter, these strategies
are also progressively more effective in controlling rent dissipation and
reducing externalities. The combination of these general featureshigher management costs but greater effectiveness- means that as a
rule, as pressure on resources increases, the political system will tend to
shift to progressively more expensive but more effective control
mechanisms.
Rose's adaptation of wealth-maximization theory to environmental
controls yields a fairly straightforward explanation for the emergence of
market mechanisms. In terms of air pollution, for example, her model
suggests that the solution to the relative-cost controversy depends
on how congested our air really is. If we are far enough out on the
horizontal line of resource pressure, then PROP may be preferable
11.

See Isaach Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule Making, 3 J.

LEGAL STUD. 257, 261 (1974).

12. See Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls, supra note 7; see also Carol M. Rose, The Several Futuresof Property: Of Cyberspaceand Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 129 (1998).

13.
14.

See Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls, supra note 7, at 9-10.
See id. at 24 fig. 8.
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because at that pressure level it minimizes total costs, despite its arguably higher system-wide costs of organization and policing. 5
More generally, as the external costs of a particular form of pollution
rise-that is, as particular environmental goods like clean air or water
become increasingly scarce - we should expect to see the control strategy
for dealing with this problem shift from RIGHTWAY (command and
control) to PROP (market mechanisms). Alternatively, if the costs of
administering a system of market mechanisms were to fall, perhaps because of the invention of inexpensive and effective monitoring devices,
then this drop might also trigger a movement from RIGHTWAY to
PROP. These possibilities, of course, are not mutually exclusive. In many
instances one would expect to see a combination of increasing benefits
(because of increasing pressure on resources) and reduced costs (because
of new monitoring technology or the like) causing a move from command-and-control regulation to market mechanisms.
B.

DistributionalTheory

The distributional theory traces its provenance to the interest group
theory of politics, the leading figure in this case being Mancur Olson. 6
The starting point here is not the efficiency of an institutional arrangement but rather its distributional implications. Different policy instruments will favor different social groups, and these groups are assumed to
compete in an effort to persuade regulators to adopt those instruments
that distribute the greatest wealth to themselves. Moreover, different
groups will have different degrees of influence over whether the political
process adopts any given instrument. Among the factors that determine a
group's influence are (1) the costs of organizing the group for political
action; (2) the per capita stakes among the members of the group with
respect to the particular issue; and (3) whether the interests17 of the group
members are aligned or in conflict with respect to the issue.
Notice that the distributional theory suggests that society may adopt
regulatory regimes that fail to maximize societal wealth. It will adopt
those regimes whose distributional features are most favorable to the
groups that can organize most effectively to influence the political process. These outcomes may well result in a decrease in total societal wealth
relative to other regimes, but because of the high costs of bargaining and
15. Id. at 28.
16. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). Another important source of modern distributional theory is
the economic theory of regulation associated with the Chicago school of economics. See, e.g., Gary S.
Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371
(1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 2 (1971).
17.

See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,

ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 67-75 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political
Faith, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 966-67 (1997).
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disparities in influence
among groups, a shift to a more efficient regime
8
may not occur.'
The most comprehensive effort to date to apply distributional theory to explain the incidence of market mechanisms in environmental law
is a recent article by Nathaniel Keohane, Richard Revesz, and Robert
Stavins. 19 They develop a model of a "political market" characterized by
demand and supply curves.2 On the demand side, different groups demand different types of regulatory instruments and have differential capacities to "bid" for their preferred outcomes.2' On the supply side, the
legislature offers to supply different regulatory instruments depending
upon the "prices" the groups are prepared to pay.22 Actual policy is a
function of the equilibrium that emerges in the political process between
the demand-side and supply-side forces.' Under this type of analysis, we
should identify the "winners" and "losers" under different environmental
regimes and ascertain which groups wield more influence with the legislature; the group or groups with the largest clout (in terms of campaign
contributions and numbers of votes) will succeed in getting their preferred regime adopted.
Distributional theory does not generate the same kind of clear-cut
hypothesis with respect to when market mechanisms will emerge that the
wealth-maximization theory does. Much depends on the form that market mechanisms take and on the perceptions that different groups hold
about the distributional effects of adopting market mechanisms. This
lack of precision is a general weakness of the interest group theory of
politics, which generally works better in supplying after-the-fact explanations than in predicting the future.24
III. THE USE

OF MARKET MECHANISMS IN ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW-

AN OVERVIEW

To engage in an assessment of the two competing positive theories
for explaining the emergence of market mechanisms, it is necessary to
have some data regarding when market mechanisms are adopted and
what form they take when adopted. To this end, it would be helpful to
have an historical overview of the experience with market mechanisms
under U.S. environmental law. Curiously, I was unable to find any
18. See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16-18, 116 (1989) (emphasizing the need for mechanisms to distribute some of the gains from more efficient property systems
from the "winners" to the "losers" to facilitate regime change in the context of property in natural resources).
19. See Keohane et al., supra note 7, at 313-14.
20. See id. at 329-39.
21. See id. at 329-33.
22. See id. at 333-39.
23. See id. at 339-46.
24. See generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 33-46 (1994).

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2000

American legal commentary providing such an overview. Notwithstanding the existence of some thirty-eight American law reviews specializing
in environmental law,' for some reason there is a dearth of descriptive
literature about this feature of current law. Fortunately, however, I did
find a useful overview in a recent monograph by Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, a Danish economist who surveyed the U.S. experience with market
mechanisms as part of a study of policy options for controlling greenhouse gases in Europe.26
According to Svendsen, there have been eight fully implemented
environmental enforcement programs in the U.S. that rely on market
mechanisms.' Five of these programs have arisen under various provisions of the Clean Air Act, and three were stimulated by the water quality standards mandated by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 2 It
is possible to quibble with Svendsen's census of U.S. market mechanisms.
The list could easily be lengthened either by expanding the definition of
an environmental program or the definition of a market mechanism or
both.29 Nevertheless, if we confine ourselves to environmental programs
in the conventional sense of programs that control the discharge of
0
physical pollutants, Svendsen's survey appears to be complete?
25.
See MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, ANDERSON'S 1999 DIRECTORY OF LAW REVIEWS AND
SCHOLARLY LEGAL PERIODICALS 16-18 (listing 29 student-edited environmental law journals); see

also id. at 35-36 (listing nine nonstudent-edited environmental law journals).
26.

See GERT TINGGAARD SVENDSEN, PUBLIC CHOICE AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

71-132 (1998).
27. See id. at 72.
28. See id.
29. For example, with respect to the definition of an environmental program, a number of jurisdictions have adopted programs of transferable development rights to limit the destruction of open
spaces. See James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful
Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 378-82 (1989) (describing the New Jersey
Pinelands development control plan). If this kind of preservation program is included within the universe of environmental programs, then the number of market mechanisms would expand significantly.
Similarly, with respect to the definition of a market mechanism, a number of jurisdictions have imposed charges on parties who engage in activities that generate externalities without making any effort
to set the charges at a level equal to the external costs of these activities. Examples include charges on
industrial emissions into municipal waste-treatment facilities, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E.
OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALIrY OF LIFE 258-63 (1979), and de-

posit and refund programs to encourage recycling of cans and bottles. See Peter S. Menell, Beyond the
Throwaway Society: An Incentive Approach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q.
655, 693 (1990). If these programs are seen as legitimate examples of market mechanisms, then such
programs would again have to be regarded as being much more numerous.
30. I offer this judgment based on previous discussions of market mechanisms found in the
American literature. See, e.g., Ester Bartfeld, Point-NonpointSource Trading:Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 ENvTL. L. 43, 44, 83-88 (1993) (discussing the Dillon Reservoir Program and the
Tar-Pamlico Program); Robert B. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessonsfor Theory
and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 366-96 (1989) (discussing the Emissions Trading Program, the
Lead Additives Trading Program, the Fox River program, and the Dillon Reservoir program); Hahn
& Stavins, supra note 7, at 15-20 (discussing the Emissions Trading Program, the Lead Additives
Trading Program, and the Dillon Reservoir program); Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
293, 307-09 (discussing the Lead Additives Program, the Acid Rain Program, and the CFC/Halon
Program). Cf BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 29 (using a 1979 survey to show that no implemented
U.S. programs would at that time qualify as market mechanisms in the sense that Svendsen uses the
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The five air pollution programs were adopted at various times
starting in 1974 and culminating most recently in 1993. They are: (1) the
Emissions Trading Program, which is really four different trading rules netting, offsets, bubbles, and banking-that apply primarily under the
nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act;31 (2) the Lead Additives
Trading Program that applied to the EPA-mandated phaseout of lead in
refined gasoline from 1982 to 1987;32 (3) the CFC/Halon Trading Program that applied during the phaseout of these ozone-depleting substantives mandated by the Montreal Protocol;33 (4) the sulfur dioxide trading
program under the Acid Rain Program established by the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act;' and (5) the Regional Clean Air Incentives
Market (RECLAIM) program adopted under state regulatory authority
in Southern California to achieve compliance with federal guidelines for
smog.3"
The three water pollution programs were adopted at various times
between 1981 and 1989. They are: (1) a discharge trading program established on the Fox River in Wisconsin in 1981;36 (2) a point/nonpoint
trading program established in 1982 at the Dillon Reservoir in Colorado;37 and (3) a point/nonpoint trading program established in the TarPamlico River Basin in North Carolina in 1989.38
Several potentially significant generalizations about these market
mechanism programs can be drawn from Svendsen's survey.
First, it is clear that market mechanisms play a distinctively secondary role in the overall American pollution control scene. Among the
five air programs, two were transitional programs no longer in use,39 and
one is a regional program.' The Emissions Trading Program and the
Acid Rain Program are more permanent and significant, but they do not
begin to exhaust the full range of air pollution control programs, most of
which remain untouched by market mechanisms. The three water pollution programs are essentially local pilot programs; they have generated a
grand total of two trades after nearly two decades of operation.4 Perhaps
more significantly, the eight market mechanisms are wholly confined to
term).
31. Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Principles for Creation, Banking and Use of
Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814,43,829 (1986).
32. Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives, 40 C.F.R. § 80.20(d) (1985).
33. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 40 C.F.R. § 82 (1988); Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489,47,515-19 (1987).
34. Clean Air Act, tit. IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
35. See generallyJohn P. Dwyer, The Use of Market Incentives in ControllingAir Pollution:California'sMarketable PermitsProgram,20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 103, 104 (1993).
36. See Wis. ADMIN. CODE § NR 212.115 (1986).
37. See 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-71 (1984).
38. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2B.0229 (Aug. 1999).
39. The Lead Additives Trading Program expired in 1987; the CFC/Halon Trading Program expired in 1996. See SVENDSEN, supra note 26, at 72.
40. RECLAIM. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
41. See SVENDSEN, supra note 26, at 114, 117, 121.
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the air and water pollution contexts. Other areas of pollution control,
such as hazardous waste management and reclamation, evidently remain
innocent of market mechanisms.
Second, the eight market mechanism programs all adopt the same
method for putting a price on pollution. In each case, the programs rely
on what have been called "grandfathered" permits - a system of tradable
permits in which permits are allocated free of charge to existing pollution
sources.4 2 None of the eight programs relies on any form of pollution fees
or taxes or on tradable permits allocated by auction. This is the most
striking consistency Svendsen's survey uncovers.
Third, each of the programs arises in a context where the standard
for acceptable levels of pollution has been independently and authoritatively established before the market mechanism was put in place. The
Emissions Trading Program and the RECLAIM program are based on
the idea that new sources of pollution should entail no further deterioration in air quality below the national ambient air quality standards previously set by the EPA.43 Similarly, the three water pollution programs are
based on the need to achieve compliance in individual watersheds with
previously established water quality standards that apply throughout an
entire state.' The Acid Rain Program is based on the political commitment, made in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, to cut the emissions
of precursor gases of acid rain by fifty percent.45 Most strikingly, the lead
and CFC/Halon programs are based on political commitments to reduce
emissions of the relevant pollutants to zero. 46 In no case do we find a
market mechanism being adopted when the applicable pollution standard remains uncertain or yet to be determined.
Fourth, there is no consistent theme regarding the scope and severity of the external costs addressed by these various market mechanisms.
Four of the five air programs are nationwide in scope. Two of these programs, the lead and CFC/Halon phasedowns, involved chemicals generally conceded to involve serious health risks as to which safe substitute
products were known to exist.47 The acid rain program, in contrast, addresses a highly divisive issue that pits one section of the country against
another and entails mostly welfare effects as to which it took a decade to
42. See id. at 75, 86, 92, 93, 108,113, 117, 120.
43. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Principles for Creation, Banking and Use
of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,814 (1986); Dwyer, supra note 35, at 117.
44. See Effluent Trading in Watersheds Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 4994, 4995-96 (1996);
Bartfeld, supranote 30, at 57-58,76-78,83-88.
45. See SVENDSEN, supranote 26, at 93; Stavins, supra note 30, at 307.
46. See Weiner, supra note 3, at 712-13.
47. See generally Barbara K. Bucholtz, Coase and the Control of TransboundaryPollution: The
Sale of Hydroelectricity Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1998, 18 B.C.
ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 279 (1991) (discussing the Montreal Protocol, CFCs, and available substitutes);
David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:Replacing the Command
and Control/EconomicIncentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998) (discussing the Lead
Phasedown Program, the Emissions Trading Program, and lead substitutes); Weiner, supra note 3, at
712-13 (discussing the Montreal Protocol, CFCs, and available substitutes).
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forge a consensus in support of any regulatory action.' The two remaining air programs are designed primarily to accommodate more economic
growth within existing pollution standards.49
The three water programs are local in scope and are limited to single watersheds. They also appear to have been designed to permit continued economic growth within existing water quality standards." One
reason these water programs have remained largely dormant is that the
relevant standards have been interpreted in a sufficiently flexible fashion
that the conflict with further growth did not materialize."
Fifth, it is also difficult to generalize about whether new monitoring
technology or other administrative innovations may be responsible in
part for these market mechanisms. Interestingly, two of the air pollution
programs employ advanced monitoring technology. The acid rain program applies to electric utilities, which are required by law to install continuous-emissions-monitoring systems (CEMS) to monitor both SO 2 and
CO 2 emissions.52 These systems, which cost about $120,000 per utility,
give the EPA "accurate data on tons emitted and make[] it possible to
run the [acid rain program] effectively from the federal level."53
Similarly, the RECLAIM program requires either CEMS for large
sources or continuous-process-monitoring systems for smaller sources.54
Other air programs, however, rely on old-fashioned double entry bookkeeping to monitor compliance. The lead phasedown and CFC/Halon
phasedown both utilized simple self-reporting forms submitted by the
parties to trades, which were then audited by regulators to assure a
matchup Evidently there was no direct monitoring of sources. The water programs rely on the same system of irregular administrative inspections utilized in connection with command-and-control requirements.56
In sum, Svendsen's survey shows that command-and-control regulation continues to dominate in all areas of U.S. pollution control policy;
market mechanisms are exceptional. As to the handful of market mechanisms that exist, two generalizations hold true. First, these programs always proceed by creating grandfathered transferable permit programs.
48.

See generally JAMES L. REGENS & ROBERT W. RYCROFr, THE ACID RAiN CONTROVERSY

154 (1989); Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL L.
1721, 1722-29 (1991). Whether acid rain has serious implications for human health remains a matter of
controversy among investigators. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science and Environmental
Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 215-18 (discussing the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, a $500 million study that failed to produce conclusive findings regarding the effects of acid rain
upon people and the environment).
49. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Principles for Creation, Banking and Use
of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,814 (1986); Dwyer, supranote 35, at 117.
50. See SVENDSEN, supra note 26, at 113-21; Bartfeld, supra note 30, at 83-88.
51. See SVENDSEN, supra note 26, at 124.
52. See id. at 93, 96.
53. Id. at 96.
54. See id. at 109.
55.
56.

See id. at 87, 91.
See id. at 114, 117, 120.
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Second, they are based on pollution control standards that have been
authoritatively established before the market mechanism is put in place.
Otherwise, the scope and severity of the pollution problems addressed
and the technology used to monitor compliance and otherwise implement these programs defy generalization.
IV. WHAT FORM MARKET MECHANISMS TAKE

In seeking to explain market mechanisms, the logical sequence
would be to consider first why market mechanisms are rarely adopted
and then to ask what form they are likely to take when they are adopted.
I will, however, reverse the order of inquiry here for two reasons. First,
there is always something to be said for addressing the easy question
first. The "what form" question has a clear and uniform answer- grandfathered permits are always the market mechanism of choice - and it is
not difficult to devise an explanation as to why this should be so. Second,
once we have identified the factors that cause grandfathered permits to
be preferred over other market mechanisms, we will have some clues
that help unlock the puzzle of why market mechanisms generally remain
a relatively marginal phenomenon in environmental law. Let us begin,
then, by asking which of the two theories described in part II best explains the form that market mechanisms take.
The first candidate for an explanatory theory- the wealthmaximization theory - cannot account for the strong and consistent preference for grandfathered permits over pollution taxes and auctioned
permits. In terms of effectiveness in reducing pollution, the calculus as to
whether taxes or tradable permits are preferred depends in part on assumptions about the slope of the marginal benefit and marginal control
cost curves, making a priori judgments impossible.57 Taxes are sometimes
said to have an advantage when we know the marginal costs of pollution
but do not know the marginal control costs because we can set the tax at
a rate equal to the marginal costs of pollution and allow polluters to
compare the tax to their own marginal control costs.58 On the other hand,
when the desired level of pollution is established on some basis other
than the marginal costs of pollution, tradable permits have the advantage: we can reach the desired level of pollution simply by printing the
right number of permits, whereas the use of taxes in this context may
make it necessary to adjust tax rates before the right level of pollution is
reached. Whatever we make of these differences, however, they at most
explain a preference for Pigouvian taxes over permits (or vice versa).
57. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 73-75 (2d ed. 1988).
58.

WALLACE

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

E. OATES,

THE

THEORY

OF

OF LAW 414-15 (5th ed. 1998)

("[E]missions standards require cost-benefit analysis; pollution taxes only require benefit analysis.").
See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
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They cannot explain why one type of permit system (for example, grandfathered permits) is consistently preferred to the other options.
In terms of management costs, pollution taxes entail the costs of
monitoring emissions and imposing and collecting taxes - costs that presumably would be borne by the public sector. But tradable permits entail
similar costs. Monitoring is necessary here, too, to insure that sources are
in compliance with permits, and it is necessary .to expend resources in establishing a market in permits and engaging in trades. Some of these
costs would be borne by the public and some by private parties. Again,
there is little basis for thinking, that the management costs associated
with one type of market mechanism (e.g., grandfathered permits) are materially lower than those associated with other types of market mechanisms, such as might account for a universal preference for one relative
to the others.
In the end, the wealth-maximization theory is simply too crude to
permit fine-grained distinctions between policy instruments like pollution taxes and marketable permits. The theory permits us to identify the
circumstances when some kind of property-rights regime will emerge.
But it has little or nothing to say about exactly what kind of regime will
be adopted. This feature is present in Demsetz's original paper, where he
noted that his theory could not predict whether property would take the
form of private property, community property, or state-owned property.59 Similarly, Carol Rose notes that the question of what form a
PROP regime takes is "[a]n especially divisive issue" that is "likely to be
hotly contested."' But she does not suggest that her theory aids in predicting how the issue is likely to be resolved.
The distributional theory, in contrast, provides a ready explanation
for the uniform preference for grandfathered permits over Pigouvian
taxes and auctioned permits. Recall that under the distributional theory,
the factors that determine a group's influence in the political process include (1) the costs of organizing the group for political action; (2) the per
capita stakes among the members of the group with respect to the particular issue; and (3) whether the interests of the group members are uniform or in conflict with respect to the issue.61
One group that has a vital interest in any effort to establish market
mechanisms is the firms that engage in polluting activities. Adoption of
any market mechanism means these firms henceforth will have to pay
(either through taxes or purchased permits) for the privilege to pollute.
The foregoing factors suggest that this group will exert strong political
pressure in opposition to any proposal for Pigouvian taxes or auctioned
59. Demsetz, supra note 8, at 359; see also Steven N.S. Cheung, The Transaction Costs Paradigm,
36 ECON. INQUIRY 514, 515 (1998) (noting that the neoinstitutionalist paradigm covers all types of
institutions for allocating resources, not just private property and markets).
60. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls;supra note 7, at 22.
61. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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permits but is likely to have a much more equivocal response to grandfathered permits. Thus, if market mechanisms are to be adopted, grandfathered permits will encounter less resistance than the other types of market mechanisms.
To see how distributional impacts dictate the choice of regulatory
instruments, consider first a Pigouvian tax scheme. Under such a scheme,
pollution from any source is assessed a tax per unit of pollution, payable
to the government.6 2 The tax creates an incentive to reduce emissions to
avoid paying the tax. Thus, sources will presumably install control devices, change inputs, relocate, or shut down so long as the costs of these
control measures are less than the costs of paying the tax. Unless the tax
is set at an extraordinarily high level, however, there will always be some
residual level of pollution from some firms as to which it is cheaper to
pay the tax than to abate the pollution. Any company that emits such residual pollution must pay taxes. Unless market conditions permit firms to
increase prices to cover the per-unit cost increase caused by the tax, they
must either reduce output or suffer a loss in profits.63
One would predict that polluting firms will be strongly opposed to a
pollution tax and will exert considerable influence in opposition to such a
tax. The polluting firms are likely to be members of a preexisting trade
association, making the costs of organizing for political action with regard to the tax relatively low. It is true that different firms in the industry
will face different levels of taxation. Firms that have high control or exit
costs will face higher taxes; firms with low control or exit costs will face
lower taxes. Presumably, however, all firms that do not relocate or shut
down will face some positive level of taxation; hence, all will perceive
that they have negative stakes in the proposal. And because all firms will
be harmed or inconvenienced, at least to some degree, the firms will
largely be aligned in opposition to the tax. Industry solidarity in seeking
to defeat the tax should, therefore, be high. All this should translate into
strong and effective industry opposition.
Compare now the situation that prevails in the face of a proposal to
adopt tradable permits. Such a system should reduce emissions just as effectively as a pollution tax. If the number of permits is set at the desired
level of pollution, emissions must be reduced to that level because no
firm can emit without a permit. In deciding how to respond to such a
scheme, each firm will compare the costs of reducing emissions to the
costs of acquiring a permit and will reduce emissions until the control
costs equal or exceed the costs of acquiring a permit. In equilibrium, the
price of a permit should thus just equal the marginal cost of control at the
level of emissions established as a goal of the system.

62. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
63. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships,43 STAN. L. REV. 361,367 n.l (1991).
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Although the regulatory effect of a permit system is generally the
same as that of a pollution tax, the distributional consequences can be
very different. Under a tax scheme, the charges for engaging in residual
pollution are paid to the government. Under a permit scheme, the
charges for engaging in residual pollution are paid to the holders of unused permits. If permits are auctioned by the government, then the distributional consequences of the two programs are the same. But if the
permits are issued on a grandfathering basis- that is, they are given
away free of charge to incumbent polluters in proportion to some baseline of emissions that exists before the scheme is initiated- then the incumbent polluters receive new wealth from the system. In effect, the
permits are like bonds printed by the government and given to the industry incumbents in accordance with their previous pollution levels.
From a distributional perspective, therefore, a grandfathered permit
scheme looks very different from a pollution tax or an auctioned permit
scheme. Industrial polluters will no longer face uniform high and negative stakes. For some polluters -those that face the highest control or
exit costs - the program may still pose the threat of lost profits. But for
others-those that can reduce pollution at low cost or were planning to
shut down in any event- the program may actually leave them in a better position. They will need to use only a portion of their permits to
cover their residual pollution and can sell the unused permits for cash.
For such firms, a tradable permit scheme operates as a government subsidy. Given that the stakes are no longer uniformly negative, a tradable
permit scheme is likely to fracture group solidarity among polluters. Incumbent polluters that receive the free permits and have no plans for expansion of output will tend to support the scheme. Firms contemplating
expansion or planning to enter the market will oppose the scheme.
In short, distributional theory suggests that tax schemes and auctioned permit schemes fail because they encounter the strong and united
opposition of existing sources of pollution. Grandfathered permit
schemes succeed - at least some of the time - because the subsidy inherent in the distribution of free permits leaves some segments of industry
better off, which shatters the industry's united opposition.
I should note that it is possible to imagine tax schemes that have the
same distributional features as grandfathered permits and hence the
same predicted consequences. For example, one could adopt a Pigouvian
pollution tax coupled with a provision that would rebate the proceeds of
the tax to incumbent firms in proportion to some baseline of emissions
before the tax was imposed. This would mirror the efficiency and distributional effects of a grandfathered permit scheme. The reason we do
not see such schemes in lieu of grandfathered permits presumably relates
to the general hostility in the American political system toward taxes and
to the greater visibility of the subsidy to incumbents if delivered in the
form of a rebate as opposed to a free permit.
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V. THE WHY QUESTION

Let us now turn to the more difficult question: why market mechanisms are utilized so infrequently in environmental law. Here, the
wealth-maximization theory makes a more serious bid for explanatory
superiority. Recall that under Professor Rose's framework, market
mechanisms not only are assumed to be more effective in reducing pollution than command and control but also are assumed to be more expensive in terms of management costs.' Given these assumptions, we can
hypothesize that market mechanisms are used infrequently because environmental resources are not, as a rule, under sufficient pressure to warrant the adoption of market mechanisms. In other words, the basic reason command and control remains dominant is that pollution is not bad
enough. Command and control will be displaced by market mechanisms
only if the pressure on environmental resources becomes worse and/or
the costs of implementing market mechanisms are reduced. It follows
that in those areas where market mechanisms have been adopted, we
should find that pressure on environmental resources is especially intense or that new monitoring devices or other administrative innovations
have occurred that have reduced the costs of adopting market mechanisms or both.
Some of the American experience with market mechanisms is consistent with the wealth-maximization hypothesis. Here, it is important not
to lose sight of the big picture. There is no question that new regulatory
regimes to control pollution have emerged in the last twenty-five years,
and these regimes are a response to the public perception that environmental degradation is a more serious problem than earlier generations
had believed. Broadly speaking, therefore, the environmental revolution
that started in the 1970s- featuring a new public sensitivity to the importance of environmental values followed by the adoption of elaborate
regulatory regimes designed to improve environmental quality -is consistent with the wealth-maximization theory, as explicated by Rose.6 5
Moreover, there is some evidence suggesting that market mechanisms
are associated with especially severe environmental problems, such as
the lead additives scheduled for elimination by the Lead Additives Program' and the ozone-depleting gases scheduled for elimination under
the Montreal Protocols.67 Finally, evidence exists that market mechanisms have been facilitated by the development of new and more effective monitoring technology, such as CEMS. 6

64. See Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls,supranote 7, at 22.
65. See generally id.
66. On the risks of lead additives, see Small Refiner Lead Phasedown Task Force v. EPA, 705
F.2d 506,527-31 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
67. See RICHARD BENEDICK, OZoNE DIPLOMACY 78-79 (1991).
68. See SVENDENSON, supranote 26, at 96-97.
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Overall, however, it would be a considerable stretch to insist that
there is any kind of consistent correlation between the severity of pollution or the adoption of new administrative technologies and the use of
market mechanisms. Market mechanisms have been adopted in circumstances where the evidence of harmful health effects is equivocal at best
(acid rain and state water quality standards), and they have been adopted
in circumstances where administrative techniques, including monitoring,
remain primitive if not nonexistent (the Lead Additives Program, the
CFC/Halon Program, and the water programs). Thus, our experience
with market mechanisms to date (admittedly too limited to provide conclusive proof one way or another) offers little support for the hypothesis
that market mechanisms emerge because of increasing pressure on environmental resources and/or innovations that reduce the costs of implementing such programs.
Can the distributional theory do better? Building on the discussion
in part IV, I think it can. As we saw in that discussion, there will be some
industry opposition to any type of market mechanism. Opposition to
pollution taxes and auctioned permits will be intense because the stakes
in such a program are uniformly negative for industry. These programs
face tough sledding. Opposition to grandfathered permits will be more
muted and mixed. Still, we can expect opposition to these programs from
those firms with high control or exit costs or firms with plans for future
expansion.
But to say that there will be some industry opposition to any market
mechanism tells only part of the story. Presumably, there will be industry
opposition to any costly environmental regulation, including command
and control. Thus, the fact that there is partial industry opposition to
grandfathered permits cannot explain why grandfathered permits triumph so rarely when pitted against command and control. To explain
why command and control remains the dominant mode of environmental
regulation, we must introduce the interests of other relevant actors. I will
here consider two: local service providers, of whom unionized labor is
the most prominent but not the only example,69 and environmentalists.
The role of the local service providers is particularly intriguing. To a
large degree, the system of command-and-control regulation adopted at
the federal level in this country in the 1970s can be seen as a form of local
economic protectionism.7 ° That system imposed uniform federal emissions standards on major industrial sources wherever located, and it focused overwhelmingly on standards for new sources - new stationary
69. Other examples of local services providers include virtually any group that supplies services
at the local level to polluting facilities and the employees who work there, ranging from dry cleaning
shops and restaurants to accountants and lawyers.
70. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-theBottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1224-27 (1992);
Thomas W. Merrill, InternationalLaw, Global Environmentalism, and the Future of American Environmental Policy, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 485,485 (1994).
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sources of air and water pollution, new automobiles, new pesticides, and
so forth.71 Incumbent sources of pollution escaped more lightly or were
not regulated at all. This system permitted the introduction of a degree
of environmental control while largely neutralizing environmental standards as a potential cause (or excuse) for industry to relocate to other regions of the country in search of lower compliance costs.
Under a command-and-control regime that applies nationwide and
places all its emphasis on new sources, the optimal strategy for a polluting firm is to stay put and to continue to operate older polluting plants as
long as possible. This, of course, also protects the interests of local service providers in older polluting industries, which tend to be concentrated
in the "rustbelt" states of the Midwest and North Atlantic. In contrast,
allowing standards to vary by region or imposing controls on existing
sources could trigger industrial out-migration in search of lower compliance costs. Such an industrial "race to the bottom" has been a matter of
concern to unions, in part because areas with lower compliance costs are
less likely to be unionized and in part because new workers tend to be
younger, and younger workers are less likely to be interested in unions.72
Note that grandfathered permits do not protect against industrial
out-migration the same way that nationally uniform command-andcontrol regimes do. Grandfathered permits contain a local protectionist
element. Incumbents receive subsidies, new entrants from the outside do
not, and these subsidies clearly give incumbents a financial advantage.
But grandfathered permits provide no incentive for incumbents to stay
put. Indeed, they provide something of the opposite incentive, insofar as
firms that shut down or move no longer need their permits and hence can
sell them for cash. In other words, the subsidy element in traditional
command and control applies only if an incumbent firm stays put and
remains in operation. The subsidy element in grandfathered permits, in
contrast, is portable: it applies to any polluting incumbent whether the
incumbent stays, moves, or closes its doors altogether.
In light of this critical difference in the nature of the subsidies to
polluters associated with the typical command-and-control regime (with
its new/old distinction) and the typical market mechanism (with its
grandfathered permits), it is not surprising that local service providers
strongly prefer command and control. Local service providers above all
71. See generally Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025
(1983).
72. Whether environmental control costs could in fact produce a race to the bottom is a matter
of some doubt. See Revesz, supra note 70, at 1211-12; Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation
and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2058-59 (1993). Suffice it to say for present
purposes that there has been a widespread perception among local service providers that compliance
cost differentials could lead to industrial out-migration. This perception continues to carry considerable weight in policy discussions-for example, with respect to whether U.S. participation in free trade
agreements might lead to a shift of industrial jobs to countries with more lax environmental standards.
See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 969 n.186
(1997).
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else want incumbent polluters to stay put and remain in operation.
Command and control creates just such an incentive. Market mechanisms, in contrast, create an incentive for plant closures.
If this is plausible, then distributional theory might offer the following story to explain the pattern of the law. In the 1970s, incumbent
industry teamed up with local service providers in support of command
and control. This protected industry incumbents from new entrants and
protected the interests of the local service providers threatened by outmigration of industry. As time moved on, however, some incumbent
polluters began to see greater advantage in grandfathered permits. One
reason was that the industrial plant of the rustbelt simply became too old
to remain competitive in the global marketplace. Industry had to modernize, whether it moved or stayed put. Either way, it would be subject to
tough new source standards under the command-and-control regime. So
the value of the protectionist element associated with command and control faded away. Another reason was that the environmental movement
began to secure support for goals that required drastic controls by incumbent plants. The lead additive phaseout, the CFC/Halon phaseout,
and meaningful acid rain reductions could not have been pursued without dramatic reductions in emissions by incumbent polluters. With respect to these sorts of initiatives, the new source/old source game was
dead and with it whatever implicit subsidy remained from command and
control.
These developments drove a wedge between the interests of incumbent industries and local service providers. Some members of industry no
longer saw much to be gained from command and control and came to
prefer grandfathered permits, which offer portable subsidies. Local service providers, of course, continued to prefer command and control, precisely because it does not offer any portable subsidy. By and large, this
group has retained sufficient influence to block any large-scale movement away from command-and-control toward market mechanisms.
Nevertheless, industry has scored isolated successes with grandfathered
permits, especially where new programs were adopted requiring significant cutbacks from existing sources of pollution.
How do the environmentalists fit into the picture? Traditionally,
environmentalists have embraced command and control and have opposed market mechanisms. Economists who tout market mechanisms
have been puzzled by this,73 since market mechanisms are in theory more
effective than command and control in achieving any given emissions
standard. A permit scheme, for example, will always achieve its stated
goal as long as permit conditions are enforced, and- new permits are not
printed. In contrast, command and control rarely achieves its stated objectives because variances and incomplete enforcement result in some
73.

See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 3.
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slippage from regulatory standards. If environmentalists really care
about the environment, the economists ask, why would they oppose what
promises to be the more efficacious regulatory tool?
More recently, there have been signs of change in the environmentalist position. The Environmental Defense Fund broke ranks in the late
1980s and played an instrumental role in designing and promoting the
tradable permit scheme of the Acid Rain Program.74 The official position
of the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council is today
moderately supportive - roughly to the effect that well-designed and
vigorously enforced market mechanisms can play a positive role in the
overall system of environmental protection.7" What accounts for this cautious change of position, and how does the environmentalist position factor into the larger picture with respect to the use of market mechanisms?
Some insight here can be gathered by looking closely at the eight
programs in which market mechanisms have been adopted. As noted in
part III, these programs have arisen only after a consensus has been
reached regarding the appropriate degree of emissions reduction. The
most dramatic examples are the lead additive phaseout and the
CFC/Halon phaseout. In both instances, an authoritative political decision was taken to reduce emissions of these substances to zero over a
relatively short period of time.76 Environmental groups could hardly object to these decisions-they were major environmentalist victories.
Given these victories, the question then became: what is the most efficacious way of getting to zero in a relatively short period of time? At this
point, environmentalists readily acquiesced in the use of market mechanisms, presumably because they implicitly agreed that this would be the
most effective way of reaching these goals.
A similar story can be told about the Acid Rain Program. Debate
raged for over two decades about what, if anything, to do about acid
rain.77 Eventually, Congress rather arbitrarily decided that emissions of
sulfur dioxide would be cut in half over ten years from a baseline level in
the later 1980s.7" Once this political commitment was taken, market
mechanisms emerged as the choice for achieving this goal most efficaciously.
The other existing market mechanisms have also been put in place
only after applicable ambient or emissions standards have been determined on independent grounds. For example, the three water pollution
programs all arose after state water quality standards had been fixed, and
the problem was how to achieve those standards without driving point

74. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 7, at 24; Keohane et al., supranote 7, at 354.
75. See SVENDSEN, supra note 26, at 138.
76. Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives, 40 C.F.R. § 80.20 (1985); Protection of Stratospheric
Ozone, 40 C.F.R. § 82 (1988).
77. See REGENS & RYCROFT, supra note 48, at 4; Waxman, supranote 48.
78. See S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 4,451 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,3390,3829.
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sources of pollution out of business. Each program was designed to allow
point sources to trade with nonpoint sources, where this would result in
equal or greater progress toward achieving the standards at lower cost to
the point sources.79
I would draw the following tentative conclusion from these reflections about the environmentalist position. Environmentalists have long
opposed and continue to oppose setting emissions standards based on
cost-benefit analyses.' They prefer that standards be set without regard
to economic costs on the basis of adequate protection of the public
health, ecosystems, or particular species. In the formative years of the
environmental movement-the 1970s-market mechanisms were espoused by persons who also espoused cost-benefit analyses." Hence, environmentalists opposed market mechanisms because they saw them as
legitimizing cost-benefit analyses. Command and control, in contrast, was
espoused by persons who supported health-based or environment-based
standards. Thus, environmentalists were naturally more comfortable with
the advocates of command and control.
As the years went by, particular situations arose in which environmentalists had already won the debate over standards, or the debate had
already been resolved via political compromise. Environmentalists came
to see that in these situations it was safe to endorse or at least acquiesce
in the usage of market mechanisms, since they would function solely as a
means to an end and would not undermine the environmentalist position
regarding the proper metric for Setting standards.82 Thus, in these situations, and these alone, we see significant environmentalist support for
market mechanisms.
When we combine these accounts of the positions of three major institutional players- industry groups, local service providers, and environmentalists- we can patch together a somewhat complex but plausible
account of why market mechanisms today play a small but not entirely
inconsequential role in American environmental law. Environmental law
began in the 1970s with a kind of "bootleggers and Baptists"' 3 alliance
centered on support for command-and-control regulation. Incumbent in79. See Effluent Trading in Watersheds Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 4994, 4996 (1996); Bartfeld, supra note 30, at 58.
80. Lynn Blais, writing in this issue, offers some reasons supporting this perspective. See Lynn E.
Blais, Beyond Cost/Benefit: The Maturationof Economic Analysis of the Law and Its Consequencesfor
EnvironmentalPolicymaking,2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 237.
81. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS? THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION

(1974).
82.

For succinct statements of this position by pragmatic environmentalists, see DANIEL A.

FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN

WORLD 119 (1999); Richard J. Lazarus, Public Versus Private Environmental Regulation, 21 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 438,440 (1994).
83. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in the Market for Regulation, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 29, 33 (Jason F. Shogren ed., 1989). The phrase "bootleggers and Baptists" is based on the claim that Sunday closing laws are enacted with the political support
of two otherwise antagonistic groups- distributors of illegal liquor and teetotalers.
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dustry supported the regime because it imposed higher costs on new entrants and thus granted a measure of protection to incumbents.' Local
service providers supported the regime because it discouraged outmigration of industry and hence protected existing demand for unionized
workers and other local inputs. Environmentalists supported the regime
because it avoided any suggestion that standards should be fixed with
economic costs in mind.
When we flash forward twenty-five years later, we see that this alliance has frayed considerably, but the result is more deadlock than a new
consensus for action. Local service providers remain fully committed to
command and control and dislike grandfathered permits because they
underwrite out-migration. Much of industry has been weaned from
command and control and now supports grandfathered permits. This
change occurred because industry realized that it had to modernize or
move to lower cost production areas, and grandfathered permits provide
portable subsidies. Environmentalists hold the balance of power. They
remain unalterably opposed to any injection of economic reasoning into
the standard-setting process. But in select areas where standards have
been fixed and are no longer contested, they are willing to back the use
of market mechanisms. Thus, the moderate movement toward market
mechanisms in recent years more or less parallels the moderate degree of
support for these instruments we find in the environmental community.
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN EXPLANATORY SYNTHESIS

My search for an explanation of the role of market mechanisms in
environmental law has been framed in terms of a sharp dichotomy between wealth-maximization theory and distributional theory. But it may
have occurred to the astute reader that there is no necessary conflict between these two explanations. To the contrary, it may be that both explanations are right, or at least partially right, and that the best explanation would entail some synthesis or combination of the two theories.
Such a synthesis is intuitively plausible. It seems unlikely that society
would devote substantial resources to establishing a new type of environmental control regime if the benefits of such a regime did not exceed
or at least cover the relevant costs. On the other hand, it also seems plausible that society will not embrace a new type of environmental control
regime if powerful groups stand opposed to such a transformation.
We have a model of sorts for such a synthesis in the work of Gary
Libecap. Especially in his work on the history of property rights in natural resources,85 Libecap has stressed both the importance of the aggregate gains from changes in the structure of property rights and the importance of "devising politically acceptable allocation mechanisms to assign
84.
85.

See id. at 34-35.
See LIBECAP, supra note 18, at 4-7.
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the gains from institutional change while maintaining its production advantages." As he has argued, it is not enough to identify an alternative
institutional arrangement, such as unitization of oil and gas pools, that
promises to increase aggregate social welfare.87 If powerful groups have a
stake in a system of separate ownership of oil and gas rights, they will resist such a change unless they .can be assured that they will end up at least
as well off after unitization as they were under separate ownership.' In
other words, wealth-maximizing changes in institutional arrangements
cannot be secured unless some device for solving distributional issues is
included in the mix.
A similar analysis applies to environmental law regimes. Take a
phenomenon like transboundary pollution.89 It may well be that some
sort of regulatory regime that limits transboundary pollution would increase the joint welfare of the source state and the affected state. But if
such a regime creates net benefits for the affected state but only net burdens for the source state, the source state will resist cooperating in the
creation of such a regime unless some mechanism for compensating it for transferring a portion of the affected state's gains back to the source
state -can be devised.' Again, distributional problems must be overcome to achieve joint wealth maximization.
The slow emergence of market mechanisms in environmental law
may perhaps also be best explained using a similar synthetic model.
Carol Rose has made an important contribution in reminding us that
even regimes that appear to be more cost-effective in limiting pollution
will usually not be adopted if the management costs of operating those
regimes exceed the allocative efficiency gains.91 Thus, one reason market
mechanisms have not been more widely adopted may be that the management costs are just too high. Achieving a significant increase in social
wealth is probably a necessary condition for any movement from command-and-control to market mechanisms, and it may be that the gains in
social wealth are not as large as the enthusiastic proponents of market
mechanisms have made them out to be, once the management costs are
fully considered. 2
On the other hand, the distributional theorists are surely correct
that to achieve a transformation in regulatory policy from command-andcontrol to market mechanisms, it will be necessary to "buy off" the most
86. Id. at 5.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 93-114.
89. See Merrill, supra note 72, at 975.
90. See id. at 972-84.
91. See Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls, supra note 7.
92. To be sure, it is not unthinkable that an environmental regime like market mechanisms
might be adopted solely for distributional reasons- after all, history is littered with examples of tariffs
and legally enforced cartels that can only be explained on distributional grounds. But it is difficult to
identify any party that is benefited to such a great extent by market mechanisms that this kind of dynamic would be plausible.
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important affected groups that have a vested interest in the commandand-control regime. A critical element in any such strategy appears to be
grandfathering- awarding the initial permits that are to be traded to existing polluters free of charge. Grandfathering purchases the support of a
critical group or at least a significant subset of a critical group - incumbent polluters. Without the subsidy reflected in free permits, this group
would almost surely oppose any movement to replace command-andcontrol regulation with pollution taxes or auctioned permits.93
It is less clear how the support of other key players can be secured
for the movement from command-and-control to market mechanisms.
As we have seen, there is some evidence that the environmental community will insist on a precommitment to strict pollution control standards
as a condition of their supporting any program of market mechanisms.
Offering such commitments might bring more environmentalists into the
market-mechanism camp, but these promises are not inexpensive. Polluters are unlikely to go along with making extravagant commitments,
which could easily wipe out any advantage they gain from the implicit
subsidy associated with market mechanisms. Overcoming the opposition
of local service providers is even more problematic. Unless and until
some method of neutralizing their opposition can be devised, they are
likely to remain firmly wedded to the cause of command and control.
The best prognosis overall is probably that market mechanisms will
see relatively limited use in the near future, notwithstanding the overwhelming consensus among economists that they are more efficient at
achieving any desired level of pollution control than is command-andcontrol regulation. One problem with the economic argument is that it
ignores the management costs of market mechanisms. Another problem
is that it ignores distributional realities. Both problems will occasionally
be overcome, but it will require considerable ingenuity to find solutions
that apply across the board.

93. Another potential advantage to distributing free permits to existing polluters is that it awards
to a "residual claimant" the social gains created by the formation of the property rights system. It has
been argued that residual claimants will have an incentive to conserve the resources used in the process of establishing property rights as compared to nonclaimants (e.g., government officials). See Terry
L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?, 50 S. ECON. J. 438, 439
(1983).

